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1. Introduction 
In this essay I explore the notion of an open-ended system, that is, a thought-system which 
is sufficiently flexible in its mode of operation so as readily to adjust to whatever changes 
might be simultaneously taking place in a given physical environment or cultural context. 
The system, in other words, must be intrinsically “self-organizing,” “self-unifying” or “self-
referential” so as progressively to take into account significant changes in the empirical data 
under analysis. It cannot, as a result, have as its structural components unchanging 
principles of Being which apply the same way in every conceivable situation, but rather 
principles of Becoming or heuristic structures which presuppose an evolutionary or process-
oriented understanding of physical reality. It is, for example, in my judgment questionable 
whether Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics with its assumption of the ontological priority 
of actuality over potentiality is well suited to the explanation of “emergence” in the natural 
and social sciences. For emergence in the strict sense of the word implies that the emergent 
reality is more than and to some extent other than its antecedent cause(s).2 Yet, according to 
Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, an effect is ontologically dependent upon its antecedent 
cause(s) for both its existence and its essence or mode of operation.3 But some metaphysical 
systems like the process-oriented philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead were conceived 
with evolution and emergence as already given or a necessary starting-point. Whitehead’s 
key metaphysical categories, namely, “actual entity” and “society,” for example, are 
specifically designed to account for both significant discontinuity from moment to moment 
and an ongoing continuity of structure and mode of operation in the empirical data under 
investigation. No metaphysical scheme, to be sure, can expect to survive unchanged over 
extended periods of time with the same measure of success in every possible new situation. 
But some thought- systems have a built-in principle of creativity so as better to account for 
the new and unexpected in the empirical data under analysis.  
In any event, this essay will consist in my defense of two interrelated theses. The first is that 
Whiteheadian structured societies are best understood as open-ended systems akin to those 
currently being proposed by individuals working in the natural and social sciences. The 
second is that an open-ended system is best understood in terms of an ongoing interplay of 
subjectivity and objectivity such as I propose for a Whiteheadian structured society. In 
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establishing my first thesis I will make reference to the work of the natural scientist Stuart 
Kauffman in his book At Home in the Universe and to the proposal of the evolutionary 
psychologist David Sloan Wilson in his book Darwin’s Cathedral. With respect to my second 
thesis, I contend that the late Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems with its exclusive 
emphasis on objectivity to the virtual exclusion of any reference to subjectivity within the 
workings of his system is upon closer examination curiously inconsistent, at least in its 
language. The net result of my presentation should be a better understanding of what I 
mean both by open-ended systems in the natural and social sciences and by Whiteheadian 
structured societies as equivalently open-ended systems in their normal mode of operation.  
2. Stuart Kauffman and self-organizing systems 
To begin with Stuart Kauffman’s notion of self-organizing systems in Nature, I note first of 
all that he is a biochemist and founder of the Santa Fe Institute in Santa Fe, New Mexico. In 
the preface to his book At Home in the Universe, he challenges the claim that natural selection 
is the sole mechanism for biological evolution: “Another source – self-organization – is the 
root source of order. The order of the biological world, I have come to believe, is not merely 
tinkered, but arises naturally and spontaneously because of these principles of self-
organization – laws of complexity that we are just beginning to uncover and understand.”4 
Natural selection, in other words, comes into play only after a certain level of self-
organization within the organism has already taken place. At that point, the Darwinian 
principles of natural selection, namely, phenotypic variation, heritability, and fitness 
consequences,5 determine which such novel experiments in self-organization will survive 
and prosper and which for various reasons (both genetic and environmental) will inevitably 
fail. Thus only a combination of self-organization and natural selection ultimately explains 
first the emergence of life from non-life and then the amazing diversity of biological species 
that have appeared on this planet in the last four billion years.  
Kauffman concedes that there is as yet no commonly agreed-upon conceptual framework 
for conjoining the principle of natural selection with principles of self-organization within 
Nature.6 But in At Home in the Universe and in a more technically oriented book 
Investigations,7 he proposes a hypothesis for the way in which self-organization and higher 
orders of complexity appear not only in the life-world but perhaps even in economic and 
political systems. Here I simply summarize Kauffman’s hypothesis and indicate how it 
seems to correspond to the way in which Whiteheadian societies originate and continue to 
evolve in complexity and scope, above all, if they are conceived as ongoing structured fields 
of activity for their constituent actual entities. If such a comparison be seen as at least 
plausible, then the conceptual formula for the self-organization of Nature which Kauffman 
claims is still lacking in the life-sciences might well be at hand in this revised understanding 
of Whitehead’s metaphysics.  
Early in his book Kauffman claims: “life is a natural property of complex chemical systems, 
that when the number of different kinds of molecules in a chemical soup passes a certain 
threshold, a self-sustaining network of reactions – an autocatalytic metabolism – will 
suddenly appear.”8 Kauffman, to be sure, bases this conclusion not on direct observation of 
empirical data, but on a careful study of the results of computer models (Boolean networks) 
which project the possible outcomes of such molecular interactions.9 His intention here is, of 
course, to speed up analysis of what might be a much longer process of trial and error in 
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Nature on its own. In any event, I now compare Kauffman’s comments on complex chemical 
systems with Whitehead’s generic description of a society: 
A nexus [of actual entities] enjoys ‘social order’ [is a society] where (i) there is a 
common element of form illustrated in the definiteness of each of its included actual 
entities, and (ii) this common element of form arises in each member of the nexus by 
reason of the conditions imposed upon it by its prehension of some other members of 
the nexus, and (iii) these prehensions impose that condition of reproduction by reason 
of their inclusion of positive feelings of that common form.10  
For Whitehead, accordingly, each actual entity is a unique self-constituting subject of 
experience with its own individual pattern of existence and activity. Yet all the actual 
entities within the society still have an analogous self-constitution by reason of their 
common “prehension” [feeling-level grasp] of the pattern proper to the self-constitution of 
their immediate predecessors in the same society. This common element of form carried 
over from one set of constituent actual entities to another constitutes their group-identity as 
a society.  
Hence, both self-organizing chemical systems for Kauffman and societies for Whitehead are 
socially organized realities emergent out of the dynamic interplay of their component parts 
or members. Where Kauffman and Whitehead differ is in their respective understanding of 
the objective reality of these systems. In his book Investigations Kauffman frequently uses the 
term “autonomous agents” to describe such self-organizing systems.11 Whitehead, however, 
thinks of societies as genetically related groupings of individual subjects of experience with 
an analogous self-constitution; but, for that same reason, a group has no agency proper to 
itself as a specifically corporate reality.12 Kauffman, on the contrary, believes that systems 
have a corporate reality proper to themselves so that they can exercise agency in their own 
right. I propose a compromise position. Whiteheadian societies are structured fields of 
activity for their constituent actual entities from moment to moment. In this sense, akin to 
Kauffman’s notion of systems, they are more than simply aggregates of their components 
but rather enduring objective realities in their own right. Yet I agree with Whitehead that, 
while societies or systems are objective realities, they are not autonomous agents in the 
sense of exercising an agency in independence of their constituent parts or members. The 
agency of societies or systems is derivative from the combined agencies of their various 
constituents (e.g., actual entities) working in unison. For example, as a functioning human 
being I am a byproduct or result of all the individual agencies at work in my body and mind 
from moment to moment but only because all these individual agencies are organized into a 
single collective agency so as to give me a sense of being more or less in charge of my own 
life. Thus I am not a mind using the body for its own purposes, nor am I a body using the 
mind for its purposes. I am a unitary reality, both mind and body at the same time, 
exercising agency only in virtue of the collective activity of mind and body working 
together.  
Yet, even if this compromise position between Whiteheadian societies and Kauffman”s self-
organizing systems is acceptable, of what practical value is it for understanding the transit 
from non-life to life? I maintain that with this somewhat revised understanding of a 
Whiteheadian society, Whiteheadian structured societies, namely, societies composed of 
sub-societies of actual entities, illustrate from a philosophical perspective how an 
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autocatalytic metabolism works to produce life from non-life, a living cell from a chemical 
soup of such molecules. My presupposition here is that Whiteheadian structured societies 
are organized hierarchically with less complex societies serving as necessary infrastructure 
for the existence and activity of more complex societies. For example, a Whiteheadian 
structured society is composed of sub-societies which may or may not involve still other 
sub-societies of actual entities. The ultimate constituents of a Whiteheadian structured 
society are thus actual entities, self-constituting subjects of experience, organized into sub-
societies. As Ervin Laszlo comments, the same hierarchical ordering is to be found in a 
systems explanation of the physical world.13 A living cell is composed of molecules which 
are themselves made up of atoms with subatomic particles as their components. Then, if one 
further pursues this correlation between Whiteheadian structured societies and Kauffman’s 
self-organizing systems, a chemical soup of molecules as described by Kauffman is 
equivalently a set of actual entities or self-constituting subjects of experience that are already 
grouped into various sub-societies or sub-systems within the soup.  
An autocatalytic metabolism takes place when a single such sub-society or sub-system takes 
on a new mode of operation or in Whiteheadian terms a new “common element of form”14 
in virtue of the way in which its component actual entities are together responding to a 
change in their external environment. This one sub-society or sub-system will then be 
different in its mode of operation from the other sub-societies/sub-systems within the soup. 
If this one sub-society/sub-system with its new common element of form is positively 
prehended by the actual entities here and now constituent of the other sub-societies/sub-
systems so that they in turn incorporate this new pattern of existence and activity into their 
own individual self-constitution, then all the sub-societies/sub-systems will have changed 
their previous common element of form and thus will be able to change over time the 
common element of form for the structured society as a whole. The structured society as a 
whole will have become a higher-order reality, in this case, a living cell. What starts out as a 
change in mode of operation or common element of form for just one sub-society/sub-
system eventually spreads to the mode of operation of all the other sub-societies or sub –
systems within the soup and a living cell results.15 
All this happens, of course, only because the ultimate constituents of all these sub-societies/ 
sub-systems are not material atoms governed by strictly mechanistic laws but rather 
“spiritual atoms,” momentary subjects of experience with an inbuilt spontaneity on a purely 
feeling-level to influence and be influenced by one another and by their common external 
environment. At the same time, this smooth transit from non-life to life does not always 
happen. More often than not, the response of the actual entities in all the other sub-
societies/sub-systems to the new mode of operation within the one sub-society/sub-system 
will be negative so that these other sub-societies/sub-systems within the chemical soup 
equivalently reject this innovation in mode of operation within their midst. As Kauffman 
comments in terms of his own understanding of an autocatalytic metabolism, “life evolves 
toward a regime that is poised between order and chaos.”16 It is never certain whether life 
will prevail over non-life and, if it does prevail, what precise form or structure it will take. 
But, if it happens, it will have happened in virtue of a principle of self-organization 
operative within the component sub-societies/sub-systems and not in virtue of some 
outside agency with an externally imposed plan of operation (as in the case of machines and 
other humanly contrived tools). 
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Finally, given that structured societies are Whitehead’s generic term not only for inanimate 
compounds but also for organisms (plants, animals, human beings), even for supra-organic 
realities like human communities and natural environments, Whitehead as well as 
Kauffman seems to believe that the same basic laws of self-organization are operative 
everywhere in the cosmic process. Kauffman, for example, compares the explosion of new 
species at the beginning of the Cambrian era on earth to the rapid spread of new 
technologies in the economic sphere and then comments: “I am not an expert on 
technological evolution; indeed, I am also not an expert on the Cambrian explosion. But the 
parallels are striking, and it seems worthwhile to consider seriously the possibility that the 
patterns of branching radiation in biological and technological evolution are governed by 
similar general laws.”17 For Whitehead, what happens within structured societies on the 
organic and supra-organic level of existence and activity is only a more complex version of 
what happens at the inorganic level of atoms and molecules. In every instance, novelty 
arises within a structured society when a change in the common element of form or 
particular mode of operation of a single sub-society is extended to all the other sub-societies 
within the structured society and the new common element of form for the structured 
society as a whole is sustained and deepened over time.  
One should not, of course, over-estimate the similarities between Kauffman’s and 
Whitehead’s world view. Kauffman limits his investigation of the laws of self-organization 
of Nature to interactions at the molecular level whereas Whitehead proposes that actual 
entities, momentary self-constituting subjects of experience which are dynamically linked 
together in a society with a common element of form are also the agents of change and 
evolution at the subatomic and atomic levels of Nature. My point in this first part of my 
essay, however, is simply to make clear that the notion of a structured society within 
Whitehead’s metaphysics supports Stuart Kauffman’s more empirically based hypothesis of 
self-organizing systems at the molecular level of existence and activity within Nature, and 
that Kauffman’s theory gives some indirect empirical evidence for Whitehead’s 
evolutionary metaphysics, the dynamic relation between actual entities and the societies 
within which they originate and to which they contribute in terms of a common element of 
form. 
3. David Sloan Wilson and unifying systems in the social sciences 
Turning now to David Sloan Wilson’s use of systems theory in his well known book 
Darwin’s Cathedral, I first note how he sees his own work in the context of contemporary 
evolutionary psychology. He admits that most of his colleagues in the social sciences deal 
with groups as collections of basically self-centered individuals, but he himself thinks 
otherwise: “What is the nature of human society? Is it a collection of self-seeking 
individuals, or can it be regarded as an organism in its own right?”18 Wilson believes that at 
least some groups of human beings include a significant minority or even a majority of 
individuals who act unselfishly toward one another. Furthermore, such groups of relatively 
unselfish human beings tend to survive and prosper in a highly competitive world because 
they have a clear sense of the common good which defines them as a group. Wilson cites 
Charles Darwin to that effect: “It must not be forgotten that although a high standard of 
morality gives but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the 
other men of the same tribe, yet that an increase in the number of well-endowed men and 
www.intechopen.com
 
Metaphysics 
 
116 
advancement in the standard of morality will certainly give an immense advantage to one 
tribe over another.”19 Sloan Wilson’s point here, in thus citing Darwin on the advantages of 
altruistic behavior among members of a human group for their continued well-being, is to 
show the importance of morality and by implication of religion as the guardian of moral 
values for group survival and prosperity in competition with other groups of human beings. 
Along the way, however, he talks about human groups as “adaptive units” and “unifying 
systems,” thereby implying that groups have an objective identity over and above the 
particular identity of the different members of the group. It is this admittedly secondary 
issue in Sloan Wilson’s overall project that I wish to address. For, Sloan Wilson’s notion of 
unifying systems likewise bears in my judgment a strong resemblance to Whiteheadian 
structured societies (above all, if a Whiteheadian society be understood as an enduring 
structured field of activity for its constituent actual entities rather than simply as an 
aggregate of such actual entities) and Whiteheadian structured societies, in turn, confirm 
from a strictly metaphysical perspective Sloan Wilson’s more empirically oriented 
understanding of how unifying systems within human society work. 
For example, in Sloan Wilson”s judgment a group can be defined as this group rather than 
another because they all share a single trait, regularly participate in a common activity:  
My bowling group is the people with whom I bowl, my study group is the people with 
whom I study, my platoon is the group of people with whom I fight, my nation is the 
group of people who share the same laws, my church is the group of people with whom 
I worship. All of these groups are defined in terms of the individuals who interact with 
respect to a given activity. There is an infinite variety of groups, but only when we 
consider an infinite variety of activities. For any particular activity, there is a single 
appropriate grouping.20  
As Wilson sees it, the evolution of a group (as opposed to the evolution of individuals 
within the group) can only be assessed in terms of this single trait or activity and how it was 
possessed or exercised amid various external changes over an extended period of time. 
Compare this understanding of how a group is defined with Whitehead’s definition of a 
society:  
The common element of form is simply a complex eternal object [pattern or structure] 
exemplified in each member of the nexus [society]. But the social order of the nexus is 
not the mere fact of this common form exhibited by all its members. The reproduction 
of the common form throughout the nexus is due to the genetic relations of the 
members of the nexus among each other, and to the additional fact that genetic relations 
include feelings of the common form. Thus the defining characteristic is inherited 
throughout the nexus, each member deriving it from those other members of the nexus 
which are antecedent to its own concrescence [self-constitution].21 
In more common sense language, what Whitehead is claiming is that the constituent actual 
entities of the society feel their affinity with one another in terms of an intuitive grasp 
[prehension] of a common trait which all of them recognize as specific to themselves as this 
society rather than some other society. That trait may evolve or change character with the 
passage of time as new actual entities arise and currently existing members cease to exist. 
But the society still has a “defining characteristic” or common trait which clearly marks it 
out as this society rather than another.  
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Thus Whitehead’s concept of a society seems to correspond to Wilson’s claim that every 
group should be defined by the possession of a common trait or specific pattern of 
existence and activity. Furthermore, if, as Whitehead proposes, actual entities are “the 
final real things of which the world is made up,”22 and if actual entities instinctively 
aggregate into societies at all levels of existence and activity within Nature, then unifying 
systems, as Wilson proposes, are operative everywhere that human beings find things that 
endure. All organisms and possibly even inanimate things are in the end groupings of 
components that work together in harmonious fashion. As Wilson comments, upon closer 
inspection organisms turn out to be social entities, an organized set of individual 
components or members, all of whom contribute in their own way to a higher-order unity 
and value.23 Hence, Whitehead’s notion of society provides a philosophical explanation 
for the way in which Wilson’s unifying systems come into existence and survive over 
time. Like the human beings within a unifying system for Wilson, all the actual entities in 
a given society somehow recognize the single trait that marks them out as this society 
rather than another. They are not a society simply because of spatial proximity to one 
another or because they all exist at the same time in cosmic history. They constitute a 
society because consciously or more often unconsciously they “feel” an affinity for one 
another and “want” to sustain it.  
I put “feel” and “want” in parentheses to indicate that actual entities for Whitehead do not 
necessarily possess self-consciousness or exercise intentionality toward one another. But 
they are still at every level of existence and activity within Nature subjects of experience in 
dynamic interrelation. For, there is really no other way to claim that components of 
Whiteheadian societies “feel” an attraction to or dislike for one another. Wilson, to be sure, 
does not make that further metaphysical claim since his focus is on unifying systems within 
human society. But, insofar as he wishes to extend the notion of unifying systems or 
adaptive units to non-human groups of organisms and possibly even to molecules in the 
transit from non-life to life,24 he is equivalently postulating the existence of some limited 
form of subjectivity or spontaneity at all the different levels of existence and activity within 
Nature. In any case, Sloan Wilson is clearly opposed to a purely reductionist approach to 
group survival and reproduction in which random genetic mutations or inherited cultural 
norms unilaterally determine human group behavior. “Confront a human group with a 
novel problem, even one that never existed in the so-called ancestral environment, and its 
members may well come up with a workable solution. The solution might be based on trial 
and error or on rational thought. Confront many human groups with the same novel 
problem and they will come up with different solutions, some much better than others. If 
the groups are isolated from each other, they may never converge on the best solution; 
evolution is not such a deterministic process.”25 For Sloan Wilson, then, cultural evolution is 
“genuinely open-ended in its outcome.”26 
There are parallels here with Whitehead’s claim that “creativity” is at work among actual 
entities at all levels of existence and activity within Nature. As he sees it, creativity 
empowers actual entities as self-constituting subjects of experience to make themselves to be 
what they are in virtue of their individual appropriation of the common element of form 
proper to the society of which they are the latest members. This evidently rules out any form 
of strict determinism within Whiteheadian societies. At the same time, the self-constitution 
of any given actual entity is not simply a matter of chance. The actual entities within a 
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society must in some measure conform to the pattern of co-existence and activity which 
their predecessor actual entities in the same society already established by their dynamic 
interrelation. Yet, as Whitehead also insists, each actual entity has an individual self-
identity; it is never fully identical with its contemporaries within the society.27 So Wilson’s 
presupposition of a trial-and-error approach to the origin and growth of unifying systems 
certainly makes sense in light of the way that creativity works within Whitehead’s 
metaphysical scheme.  
There is, of course, a major point of difference between Whitehead and Sloan Wilson on the 
issue of the objective reality of a society, on the one hand, and a unifying system on the 
other hand. If actual entities are really different from one another even within the same 
society and, above all if, as we have already noted, societies do not exercise agency except in 
and through their constituent actual entities, then Whiteheadian societies and Sloan 
Wilson’s unifying systems seem to be at best superficially the same. Much like Stuart 
Kauffman with his notion of self-organizing systems, Wilson claims that unifying systems 
are higher-order ontological realities existing in their own right and exercising some 
measure of control over their component parts or members. An affinity between 
Whiteheadian societies and Wilson’s unifying systems, however, can be still asserted if one 
also accepts my modification of Whitehead’s notion of society as a structured field of 
activity for its constituent actual entities. For, in that case, Whiteheadian societies do have an 
objective reality over and above the interplay of their constituent actual entities from 
moment to moment. Furthermore, the society does exercise a collective agency which is 
indeed derivative from the individual agencies of all its constituent actual entities, yet which 
still allows the society to exercise the equivalent of an agency in its own right. This is 
especially the case with Whiteheadian structured societies in which there exists a privileged 
"nexus" within the structured society which is “regnant” over all the other sub-societies, but 
only in the interests of the structured society as a whole. 
That is, for Whitehead structured societies are composed not only of subordinate societies 
but of subordinate “nexuses” as well.28 Sub-societies enjoy a certain independence of the 
structured society within which they here and now exist since they are societies in their own 
right; they sustain a common element of form or defining characteristic even apart from 
participation in the structured society. An example of a sub-society would be a molecule 
within a cell; it would still be a molecule of a certain type even apart from participation in 
the life of the cell. But a nexus, especially an “entirely living nexus” which shows a high 
degree of originality in the succession of its constituent actual entities cannot for that same 
reason sustain a defining characteristic or common element of form apart from the support 
of the sub-societies of non-living actual entities within the structured society as a whole.29 
What Whitehead evidently has in mind here with an “entirely living nexus” of actual 
entities is what Aristotle called the “soul” or the life-principle of the body but with one key 
difference. For Aristotle, the soul was an immaterial reality, an intelligible form or essence, 
which is the actuality of the body as a material entity.30 For Whitehead, the entirely living 
nexus within a structured society is different only in degree of originality, not in kind, from 
the other sub–societies within the structured society. All actual entities, after all, have a 
psychic as well as a physical reality.31 The only difference between them is whether and to 
what degree the psychic dimension or the physical dimension has priority over its 
counterpart.  
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In either case, however, the entirely living nexus and all the non-living sub-societies within 
a structured society together constitute a unified collective activity for the maintenance of 
the structured society as a whole so that it can exercise an agency proper to itself as a 
specifically corporate reality. Put once more in common sense language, as a human being I 
exercise an agency derivative from all the individual agencies at work in my mind and body 
at every moment. I am not an immaterial soul imprisoned for the moment in a material 
body. Nor am I a body with a mind as a tool for its own purposes. I am a unified soul/body 
reality in virtue of all the agencies, both physical and mental, at work within me at every 
moment. So understood, a Whiteheadian structured society seems to correspond nicely with 
David Sloan Wilson’s notion of a unifying system or adaptive unit in Darwin’s Cathedral. 
Likewise, the notion of Whiteheadian structured societies seems to confirm Sloan Wilson’s 
further claim that groups of organisms often function like higher-order individual 
organisms32 and that individual organisms have themselves evolved from “social groups of 
past ages which have become so functionally integrated that we see the whole more than the 
parts”33  
4. Niklas Luhmann and self-referential systems 
In the final part of this essay I offer a critique of the late Niklas Luhmann’s understanding 
of social systems as purely objective, that is, as devoid of subjectivity in their internal 
workings. I argue on the contrary that, if subjectivity and objectivity intrinsically 
condition one another within a Whiteheadian structured society, and if there is a 
structural affinity between a Whiteheadian structured society and what Luhmann calls a 
“self-referential system, then pace Luhmann subjectivity in some form or another must be 
present in these self-referential systems which he regards as the basic paradigm for social 
systems. In 1984 Luhmann published a comprehensive outline of his systems theory in 
Soziale Systeme (Social Systems). As Eva Knodt comments in the Foreword to the English 
translation:  
Luhmann lays out a theoretical groundwork which subsequently provides a frame for 
a description of modern society as a complex system of communications that has 
differentiated itself horizontally into a network of interconnected social subsystems. 
Each of these systems reproduces itself recursively on the basis of its own, system-
specific operations. Each of them observes itself and its environment, but whatever 
they observe is marked by their unique perspective, by the selectivity of the 
particular distinctions they use for their observations. There is no longer an 
Archimedian point from which this network could be connected in an all-embracing 
vision.34 
Thus metaphysics precisely as such an all-embracing vision of reality plays no role in 
Luhmann’s analysis of the operations of systems. Likewise, for him human subjectivity and 
any other forms of subjectivity or spontaneity within Nature are reduced to being no more 
than the sine qua non conditions for the operation of an objective system.35 
Yet within Luhmann’s systems theory interdependence among separate systems seems to be 
taken for granted. Each system, to be sure, operates according to its own internal rules and 
thus is not directly affected in its operation by the existence and activity of other systems in 
its environment.. But Luhmann also allows for “structural coupling”: “a state in which two 
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systems shape the environment of each other in such a way that each depends on the other 
for continuing its autopoiesis [self-constitution] and increasing its structural complexity.36 
Key here is Luhmann’s antecedent understanding of self-referential systems: “systems that 
have the ability to establish relations with themselves and to differentiate those relations 
from relations to their environment.”37 As I shall indicate shortly, such a definition of self-
referential systems likewise seems to hold for a Whiteheadian society, provided that the 
society be understood as an objective structured field of activity for its constituent actual 
entities from moment to moment. Luhmann, of course, would strongly object to this 
comparison between a Whiteheadian society and his own notion of a self-referential system 
since the latter is “non-psychic.”38 That is, its components are “elements” with purely 
objective relations to one another in virtue of the structure of the system.39 They are not 
momentary subjects of experience with “internal” relations to one another.40 But can a 
system be self-referential without reference to subjectivity as exercised either by the system 
as a whole or, as in the case of Whiteheadian societies, by its constituent actual entities in 
their internal relations to one another? Luhmann, for example, states: “systems must create 
and employ a description of themselves; they must be able to use the difference between 
system and environment within themselves, for orientation and as a principle for creating 
information.”41 Yet can a system as a purely objective reality “create and employ” a 
description of itself so as to orient itself vis-à-vis other systems and thereby to generate 
information? 
For Luhmann there are indeed “psychic systems” which co-exist along with other social 
systems (organisms, machines, etc.) within the overall ambit of systems theory.42 Likewise, 
the ongoing co-existence of psychic systems demands a new kind of social system 
(communication systems) to determine the boundaries between psychic systems. As 
internally organized self-referential systems, psychic systems cannot determine their proper 
boundaries vis-à-vis one another.43 A higher-order system (a communication system) must 
come into play to regulate this “indeterminability” among psychic systems.44 Yet Luhmann 
is adamant that the concept of “subject” as used by Immanuel Kant and others should be 
replaced by the concept of self-referential system:. “Selection can no longer be conceived as 
carried out by a subject, as analogous with action. It is a subjectless event, an operation that 
is triggered by establishing a difference.”45 But he then adds: “Difference does not determine 
what must be selected, only that a selection must be made. Above all, the 
system/environment difference seems to be what obliges the system to force itself through 
its own complexity, to make selections.”46 Once again, the language of subjectivity is 
unmistakably present: the system/environment difference somehow “obliges the system to 
force itself to make selections.” How does a system lacking in subjectivity make such a 
selection? 
In his book Luhmann Explained, Hans Georg Moeller makes clear that Luhmann does not 
deny the de facto reality of human beings but only claims that human beings exist on 
several levels at once (bodily, mentally, socially) and that these levels as autonomous self-
referential systems do not make up an organic whole.47 Generalizing even further, Moeller 
argues that for Luhmann “[r]eality is not an all-embracing whole of many parts, it is 
rather a variety of self-producing systemic realities, each of which forms the environment 
of all the others. There is no common ‘world’ because reality is in each instance an effect 
of individual systemic autopoieses.”48 Luhmann consciously borrowed the term autopoiesis 
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from his analysis of the work of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, two biologists 
from Chile who applied systems theory to the study of biological reproduction, the way in 
which living cells are from moment to moment the product of their own internal 
processes of reproduction.49 But, whereas subjectivity would seem to be presupposed in 
the reproductive process of living cells, for Luhmann it is not present in self-referential 
systems. Hence, even if one concedes the usefulness of general systems theory as a 
methodology for objective analysis and comparison of otherwise loosely connected 
scientific disciplines, does it from a philosophical perspective offer anything more than a 
fragmented understanding both of human nature and of the workings of Nature as a 
cosmic process?  
I turn now to a comparison of Luhmann’s notion of a self-referential system with my own 
modified understanding of a Whiteheadian structured society. As already noted, 
Luhmann claims that social systems are invariably self-referential systems, namely, 
“systems that have the ability to establish relations with themselves and to differentiate 
these relations from relations with their environment.”50 In Process and Reality Whitehead 
seems to say approximately the same thing about the way in which a society is internally 
organized: “Thus in a society, the members can only exist by reason of the laws which 
dominate the society, and the laws only come into being by reason of the analogous 
characters of the members of the society.”51 Just as in Luhmann’s notion of a self-
referential system, therefore, a Whiteheadian society seems to be self-referential. There is 
an ongoing dynamic exchange between its constituent actual entities and the laws or 
objective structure of the society to which they belong so that each society in virtue of its 
own internal mode of operation is objectively somewhat different from other societies of 
actual entities in its environment. Where Luhmann and Whitehead differ in their 
respective description of the constituents of a system or society is that for Luhmann the 
“elements” which constitute the system are purely objective. They have no value in 
themselves apart from the system: “the unity of an element (e.g., an action in an action 
system) is not ontically pregiven. Instead the element is constituted as a unity only by the 
system that enlists it as an element to use in its relations.”52 For Whitehead, on the 
contrary, the constituent actual entities are ontological realities in their own right; in 
Whitehead’s view, they are “the final real things of which the world is made up” quite 
apart from their belonging to any given society.53 
But precisely here is where Whitehead may have erred in putting too much emphasis on the 
role of individual subjectivity in the makeup of a society.. In giving constituent actual 
entities an ontological reality distinct from the society to which they belong,54 Whitehead 
seems to have reduced the ontological status of the society to that of a genetically linked 
aggregate of analogously constituted actual entities. Yet an aggregate of constituents, 
however closely connected, does not correspond to what Luhmann has in mind with a self-
referential system determining its own mode of operation vis-à-vis other systems. Here, 
however, is where my redefinition of a Whiteheadian society as an objectively structured 
field of activity for successive generations of actual entities (momentary self-constituting 
subjects of experience) could possibly bridge that difference by way of a compromise 
position. If a Whiteheadian society has an enduring objective reality as a structured field of 
activity for its constituent actual entities in their dynamic interplay from moment to 
moment, this allows for the objectivity which Luhmann so highly prizes and at the same 
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time grants to the elements of the system in question a subjectivity or innate power of self-
constitution on which Whitehead insists. 
That is, just as in Luhmann’s understanding of systems and their elements, in my 
interpretation of Whiteheadian societies there is clear top-down causality from the common 
element of form of the society upon its constituent actual entities in their individual self-
constitution from moment to moment. But whereas Luhmann, given his focus on objectivity, 
basically ignores the supporting role of individual elements in the formation of a system’s 
governing structure, I agree here with Whitehead in his insistence that the origin and 
maintenance of the governing structure of the society comes from the ongoing interrelated 
activity of its constituents, namely, actual entities as momentary self-constituting subjects of 
experience. Thus, whereas Whitehead in his understanding of a society focuses exclusively 
on the efficient causality of constituent actual entities in shaping their common element of 
form as a society, and while Luhmann emphasizes the formal or informational causality of 
the governing structure of the system in organizing its various elements, I choose the middle 
path in my claim that a Whiteheadian society and a self-referential system for Luhmann 
should be considered as constituted in equal measure by bottom-up causality and by top-
down causality. In this way, there is a suitable combination of subjectivity and objectivity in 
producing the functional unity of either a Whiteheadian society or a self-referential system 
for Luhmann. 
Still another feature of a self-referential system as described by Luhmann in Social Systems is 
to be found in his notion of system differentiation: “System differentiation is nothing more 
than the repetition of system formation within systems. Further system/environmental 
differences can be differentiated within systems. The entire system then acquires the 
function of an ‘internal environment’ for these subsystems, indeed for each subsystem in its 
own specific way.”55 This can be usefully compared with Whitehead’s concept of a 
structured society, a society “which includes subordinate societies and nexuses with a 
definite pattern of structural interrelations. A structured society as a whole provides a 
favorable environment for the subordinate societies which it harbors within itself. Also the 
whole society must be set in a wider environment permissive of its continuance.”56 
Luhmann’s notion of system differentiation and Whitehead’s understanding of structured 
societies, however, are brought into even closer conceptual alignment if one thinks of both 
Whiteheadian societies and Luhmann’s self-rerferential systems in terms of structured fields 
of activity for their constituents (actual entities or elements). Physical reality, in other words, 
is best seen in terms of fields within fields. The term “field,”of course, is an analogous rather 
than a univocal concept. That is, it can be applied to different contexts with somewhat 
different results as a consequence of a particular mode of operation. A gravitational field 
between two planets in the solar system has a different mode of operation than an 
environmental field in its mode of operation with respect to the plants and animals living 
within it. Yet in both cases the field (Whiteheadian society or self-referential system) 
possesses an internal unity and thus has an individual identity by reason of the ongoing 
interplay of its constituent parts or members (its constituent actual entities/objective 
elements). Likewise, in both cases the field in question normally serves as part of the infra-
structure of still other more comprehensive fields of existence and activity for entities within 
the overall system of Nature. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this essay I have tried to vindicate the notion of an open-ended system in two ways. In the 
first place, I set forth my hypothesis that Whiteheadian societies, above all structured societies, 
are open-ended systems. That is, the system itself contains structural elements or components 
(actual entities, momentary self-constituting subjects of experience) that are applicable to an 
ever-expanding range of empirical data to be found in the natural and social sciences. The 
cognitive system, therefore, can easily adjust to a new situation, an altered physical 
environment, without damage to the integrity of its underlying world view or metaphysical 
vision. Secondly, I have proposed that the notion of self-organizing, unifying or self-referential 
systems as used by Stuart Kauffman, David Sloan Wilson and Niklas Luhmann respectively in 
the elaboration of their more empirically oriented theories in the natural and social sciences 
can be usefully compared with the notion of a Whiteheadian structured society as a strictly 
metaphysical or trans-empirical concept so as to gain a broader philosophical understanding 
of what is going on in the world of Nature and within the human mind on a day-to-day basis.  
Such a comprehensive vision of reality, to be sure, has always been the goal of 
metaphysical systems in Western civilization from ancient times until the present 
moment. But, if the notion of a Whiteheadian society (above all, a structured society) does 
qualify as the master metaphor or governing concept within an evolutionary 
understanding of reality, then what has traditionally been meant by metaphysics as an 
academic discipline has undergone a subtle but quite significant change. That is, if the 
structural elements of the metaphysical system are no longer to be regarded as 
unchanging principles of Being but rather as principles of Becoming, namely, 
indeterminate heuristic structures for the organization and analysis of empirical data, 
then the traditional meaning and value of metaphysics as an academic discipline has been 
transformed. Metaphysics is then not the systematic articulation of the way “things” are 
apart from the workings of the human mind, but rather a model or imperfect 
representation of repetitive patterns of existence and activity within various processes in 
an event- oriented rather than a thing-oriented world. 
In effect, then, metaphysical systems should be seen in the same light as models or 
paradigms in the natural and social sciences: that is, “abstract symbol systems which 
inadequately and selectively represent particular aspects of the world for specific 
purposes.”57 Metaphysical systems are, however, for that reason not to be considered simply 
as fictional or purely contrived imaginative schemes. As Ian Barbour in his book Religion and 
Science comments about the use of models or paradigms in both religion and science, they 
“are to be taken seriously but not literally; they are neither literal pictures nor useful fictions 
but limited and inadequate ways of imagining what is not [directly] observable. They make 
tentative ontological claims that there are entities in the world something like those 
produced in the models.”58 This is also what Alfred North Whitehead seems to have had in 
mind with the following comment in the opening chapter of Process and Reality:  
Rationalism never shakes off its status of an experimental adventure. The combined 
influences of mathematics and religion, which have so greatly contributed to the rise of 
philosophy, have also had the unfortunate effect of yoking it with static dogmatism. 
Rationalism is an adventure in the clarification of thought, progressive and never final. 
But it is an adventure in which even partial success has importance.59 
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